Quantum secret sharing (QSS) schemes without entanglement have huge advantages in scalability and are easier to realize as they only require sequential communications of a single quantum system. However, these schemes often come with drawbacks such as exact (n, n) structure, flaws in security and in lack of effective cheating detection, which need urgent optimizations. To address this, we propose a verifiable framework of utilizing entanglement-free states to construct (t, n)-QSS schemes. Our work is the first step towards perfect security in entanglement-free QSS, and it sheds light on how to establish effective verification mechanism against cheating. As a result, the proposed framework has a significant importance in constructing QSS schemes for versatile applications in quantum networks due to its intrinsic scalability, flexibility and perfect security.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Sharing a secret among multiple users with efficiency is a significant problem in practice. Currently several schemes called secret sharing (SS) are proposed to attain this gaol. An important class of secret sharing schemes is (t, n) threshold secret sharing [(t, n)-SS] scheme proposed by Shamir [1] and Blakely [2] independently in 1979 with wide applications [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] . Two criteria should be considered in a well-defined (t, n) threshold scheme [1, 2] . The first one is reliability, meaning the scheme should allow given subsets of authorized users to reconstruct the secret faithfully when the size of the subset is not smaller than threshold t (access structure). However, if the size condition is not satisfied, the users should not gain any information about the secret (even with unlimited computation recourse) and this is the second criterion, confidentiality. In those schemes, classical information is encoded by mathematical transformations, which have been proven to be information-theoretically secure.
In classical cryptography systems, it is well known that most classical cryptosystems employ the assumptions of computational complexity to ensure security, but they might be broken by the development of advanced tools such as quantum algorithms [9, 10] . So, quantum cryptography has attracted much attention due to its inherent security, which relies on physical laws such as Heisenberg uncertainty principle and the resulted quantum nocloning theorem [11, 12] . Due to those properties, using quantum secret sharing (QSS) to share secrets among users is more reliable and promising. Furthermore, it also provides a robust and secure solution to quantum state storage and computation [13] . The first QSS scheme was proposed by Hillery et al. [14] (HBB) in 1999, which takes advantage of a three-qubit entangled Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) state. In the scheme, a GHZ triplet is split and each particle is delivered to a user. Both users measure their own particles in natural basis and combine the results to obtain the dealer's measurement result. Following the similar idea, various (HBBtype) QSS schemes using quantum correlations in wellconstructed entangled states are proposed [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] . However, these entanglement-based schemes are poor in scalability because engineering entanglement among large number of particles is unrealistic in current experiments [23, 24] . Moreover, quantum correlations are prone to be spoiled by weak interactions with outside environments because of decoherence and this may lead to a wrong result of the computation [25] . Another problem in these schemes is that a failure measurement owing to inefficient detection can easily render an invalid round.
Thus, QSS schemes without entanglement will be more practical to quantum network and have also attracted a lot of attention. For instance, in Schmid's scheme [26] , a single qubit is used to carry the secret and participants use phase shift operations to embed random values into the qubit, such that the secret can be recovered later by exchanging random numbers. In a recent work [27] , the authors show that schemes based on multi-system entanglement can be mapped into much simpler ones involving only single system, which is a useful method to reduce complexity of entanglement QSS. In the same year, V. Karimipour et al. [28] further optimize the method and improve the efficiency from 1/d to 1/2. Such schemes only require sequential communication of a single quantum state and thus, have significant advantages in scalability and make proof-of-concept experiments feasible. However, they are all (n, n) structure which are not authentic threshold secret sharing in nature because they require all n shareholders to participate in secret recovering. Besides, most of them have been shown to be vulnerable to attacks. For example, Schmid's scheme will no longer be secure if someone adopts the attack proposed in [29] ; Karimipour's scheme is also not secure because any one dishonest participant can recover the secret without the aid of other participants [30] . Moreover, their schemes need a trusted third party (e.g. the dealer) in secret reconstruction, who is appointed to measure the processed quantum states; such a cheat is not under consideration in their schemes that a participant can publish fake random numbers in secret reconstruction, as a result the participant can recover the true secret only himself while others cannot.
In this paper, we propose a general framework of verifiable entanglement-free (t, n)-QSS schemes and present a concrete implementation. Moreover, schemes constructed under the verifiable framework have the following 3 properties which can address the drawbacks in previous works.
(i) Scalability. These schemes only require sequential communication of a single quantum system, i.e., each participant performs their own unitary operations sequentially on a quantum state. As a result, entanglement-free states make these schemes scalable with growing participants.
(ii) Threshold structure. One can encode the secrets and corresponding shares generated in classical (t, n)-SS into phases of quantum states and this provides a class of (t, n)-QSS for different applications in the sense that classical ones may be generated by versatile methods such as interpolation polynomial [1] , linear code [31, 32] , geometric structure [2] , Chinese Remainder Theorem [33, 34] , etc. Such schemes satisfy both reliability and confidentiality conditions for (t, n) structure and are perfect in security based on classical (t, n)-SS.
(iii) Verification mechanism. The last participant (sequential order) measures the final state and this frees the requirement of trusted third-parties. Thanks to the auxiliary particle, cheat of any participant (including the last one) and eavesdropping can be detected by verifying the consistency of the recovered results.
After diagnosis this general framework, we use Quantum Fourier transformation (QFT) and generalized Pauli operation to construct a d-level QSS as a concrete implementation. First, the dealer generates n shares from a secret and allocates each share to shareholders as in a proper classical (t, n)-SS. Then at least t participants perform generalized Pauli operations (in some order) sequentially on a processed state. Subsequently, the last participant performs Inverse QFT (IQFT) and then measures the quantum state in computational basis. At last, these participants exchange private random numbers embedded into the qudit such that they can recover the dealer's secret independently from measurement results. Eavesdropping and cheat can be detected at the final step. For the purpose of illustration, we use Shamir's scheme as the proper classical SS to show our entanglement-free (t, n)-QSS step by step.
II. FRAMEWORK OF ENTANGLEMENT-FREE (t, n)-QSS
This section presents 2 frameworks of entanglementfree (t, n)-QSS, which allow any classical (t, n)-SS to be used to enable the threshold structure. Moreover, several single quantum system can be applied to the frameworks and makes QSS schemes to be entanglement free.
Let t, n (t ≤ n) be positive integers, we define that an entanglement-free (t, n)-QSS is a quantum version of (t, n)-SS, which divides a secret into n shares and allocates each share to a shareholder such that a minimum t shareholders are required to recover the secret, while no entanglement states are involved in the protocol.
A. Basic framework of entanglement-free (t, n)-QSS An entanglement-free (t, n)-QSS consists of 4 algorithms, classical private Share Distribution SD(s, U), Secret Encoding SE(ϕ, S), Sequential Operation of single quantum system SO(ϕ 0 , U m , Ω m , P m ) and Secret Reconstruction SR(ϕ m , P m ).
SD(s, U)-it takes the private value s and the set of n shareholders U as input and generates Ω, the set of n shares as output.
SE(ϕ, S)-it provides ϕ 0 as output, which is obtained through encoding the secret S into a given quantum state ϕ.
SO(ϕ 0 , U m , Ω m , P m )-it takes the secret-encoded quantum state ϕ 0 , the set of m (m ≥ t) participants U m , the corresponding share set Ω m and the set of m random numbers P m as input. After m sequential unitary operations performed by U m , ϕ 0 is mapped into ϕ m as output.
SR(ϕ m , P m )-it takes ϕ m and the set of m private random numbers P m as input while recovers the secret S to be output.
To make it clearer, we further explain the entanglement free (t, n)-QSS framework in details as follow.
classical private Share Distribution SD(s, U) is the same as share distribution in classical (t, n)-SS. In the algorithm, a dealer divides the private value s (the secret in classical (t, n)-SS) into n shares and allocates each share to a shareholder securely. Note that the private value s is not the secret S to be shared in our framework. We enforce no constraint at this step, i.e., any classical (t, n)-SS could be applied to the algorithm.
Secret Encoding SE(ϕ, S)-In this algorithm, the dealer encodes the secret S into an initial single quantum state ϕ and thus transforms ϕ into a new state ϕ 0 . Then, the dealer sends ϕ 0 to a group of shareholders (participants) who would later collaborate to recover the secret.
Sequential Operation of single quantum system SO(ϕ 0 , U m , Ω m , P m )-In this algorithm, m participants U m perform sequential unitary operations on the received ϕ 0 to embed their shares in the state. Specifically, on receiving ϕ i−1 , 0 ≤ i ≤ m, each participant U i ∈ U m computes a component c i with its share s i ∈ Ω m , embeds c i and a private random number p i ∈ P m into ϕ i−1 to generate ϕ i by performing some unitary operations. As a result, ϕ 0 is finally transformed into quantum state ϕ m . Note that for a single quantum system, many unitary operations such as phase shift, generalized Pauli operation, etc., can be utilized here.
Secret reconstruction SR(ϕ m , P m )-In this algorithm, the last participant U m ∈ U m measures ϕ m and pub-lishes the measurement result. All participants exchange private random numbers in P m and recover the secret S independently from the measurement result. Remark 1. As mentioned above, this framework is flexible since all classical (t, n)-SS schemes can be used in share distribution and multiple unitary operations can be selected to embed private components into target state. Moreover, due to the application of single quantum system, no entanglement is required in the framework. Therefore, schemes under this framework are more practical in experiments.
B. Verifiable framework of entanglement-free (t, n)-QSS
Obviously, if any participant embeds a wrong component (e.g.,using the wrong share ) or the quantum system is eavesdropped in the algorithm of SO(ϕ 0 , U m , Ω m , P m ), or the last participant publishes a wrong measurement result in SR(ϕ m , P m ), some participants will recover a wrong secret. As a matter of fact, the above attacks can be effectively thwarted by simply adding a verification quantum state to the framework. The verifiable framework uses k (k ≥ 1) single quantum states to encode k secrets. Moreover, it utilizes an extra single quantum state to encode the verification value, by which each participant can verify the correctness of the recovered secrets. As a result, the improved framework is able to detect cheat attack by participants and eavesdropping attack by outside adversaries.
The verifiable framework also consists of 4 algorithms, classical private Share Distribution SD(s, U), Secret Encoding SE({ϕ v , S v |v = 1, 2, ..., k + 1}), Sequential Operation of single quantum system SO({ϕ v0 |v = 1, 2, ..., k + 1}, U m , Ω m , P m ) and Secret Reconstruction SR({ϕ vm |v = 1, 2, ..., k + 1}, P m ).
The verifiable framework shares the same algorithm of SD(s, U) with the basic framework.
SE({ϕ v , S v |v = 1, 2, ..., k + 1})-In this algorithm, the dealer first encodes k secrets S 1 , S 2 , ..., S k into initial single quantum states ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 , ..., ϕ k respectively. Then, it encodes S k+1 into the initial single quantum state ϕ k+1 as verification such that
After encoding, these initial states are transformed into ϕ 10 , ϕ 20 , ..., ϕ (k+1)0 respectively. Finally, the dealer sends these states to participants for secret reconstruction.
.., U m } want to recover secrets. The first participant U 1 ∈ U m performs unitary operations on received ϕ v0 to embed its component c 1 , generated from share s 1 ∈ Ω m and a random number p 1 ∈ P m , into each state. As a result, ϕ v0 is transformed into quantum states ϕ v1 . The next participant U 2 ∈ U m repeats the operations as U 1 does. Finally, all states are transformed into ϕ vm , v = 1, 2, ..., k + 1 by the last participant U m . SR({ϕ vm |v = 1, 2, ..., k + 1}, P m )-In the algorithm, the last participant U m measures all the quantum states ϕ vm , v = 1, 2, ..., k +1 and publishes measurement results among U m . All m participants in U m mutually exchange their private random numbers in P m . Then each participant recovers secrets S 1 , S 2 , ..., S k , together with the verification value S k+1 , independently and checks whether S k+1 = f (S 1 , S 2 , ..., S k ) holds. If it is true, all secrets are recovered correctly; otherwise, the recovered results are discarded.
Remark 2. The verifiable framework uses an extra single quantum state to enable verification. As a matter of fact, only one single quantum state is enough for the purpose of both encoding and verification.
For a given secret S ∈ GF(q), we first encode it into the form S ′ = S|H(S) ∈ GF(d) as the new secret, where H(S) is some form of verification value of S, e.g., the oneway hash value of S or checksum of S in terms of some type of coding rule; the notation | denotes the operation of concatenation, d is a prime larger than q. Then, we employ the basic framework to share the new secret S ′ (suppose that the basic framework shares a secret in GF(d)). In secret reconstruction, each participant checks whether the recovered secret has the form of S|H(S), if it does, the secret S is correctly recovered; otherwise, the secret is wrong.
Remark 3. In both frameworks, one share is generated from a single private value s for each participant. If the single quantum system employs at least two Mutually Unbiased (orthonormal) Bases as the measurement bases, a share can be used repeatedly to share multiple secrets and guarantee the perfectness in security of the constructed (t, n)-QSS scheme. However, if only using the computational basis to measure the quantum system (e.g., in the proposed scheme in section III), in order to guarantee the above perfectness, k private values are required to generate k shares for each participant.
In section III, by following the framework, a verifiable entanglement free (t, n)-QSS scheme is proposed based on QFT and generalized Pauli operation. The scheme uses 3 single quantum states to share 2 secrets among participants and enables each participant to verify the correctness of recovered secrets.
III. QFT-BASED ENTANGLEMENT FREE
(t, n)-QSS
In this section, we will first introduce 3 basic quantum operations, and then present a concrete QFT based d-level (t, n)-QSS by following the verifiable framework. Finally, the correctness of scheme is present.
A. Three quantum operations
We first introduce three useful quantum operations, i.e., QFT, Inverse QFT and generalized Pauli operation.
They play important roles in our QSS schemes.
Definition 1 : Quantum Fourier transform is defined as a linear operator performed on d orthogonal basis |0 , |1 , ..., |d − 1 in the following way
where ω = e 2πi/d is the dth root of unity. Definition 2. Inverse Quantum Fourier Transform is defined as the inverse operator of QFT
and it is also a linear operator. Definition 3. On Hilbert space of a d-level quantum system, the generalized Pauli operation U m,n is defined as
where m, n ∈ GF(d), d is a large prime [35] . With QFT, the generalized Pauli operation U m,n may complete the following transformation:
B. QFT based entanglement-free (t, n)-QSS According to the verifiable framework, the scheme consists of four algorithms, classical private Share Distribution, Secret Encoding, Sequential Operation of single quantum system and Secret Reconstruction. In the following, we will discuss each phase in details.
classical private Share Distribution. In this algorithm, the dealer Alice generates and distributes classical private shares to n shareholders Bob j , j = 1, 2, ..., n. As mentioned in Remark 3, Alice generates 3 shares from 3 private values respectively for each shareholder to guarantee the security.
(i) Alice picks up 3 random polynomials f v (x), v = 1, 2, 3, of degree at most t − 1 (t ≤ n) over finite field GF(d):
where s v = a v0 = f v (0) denotes the private values, and all coefficients a vj , j = 0, 1, ..., t − 1, are in the finite field GF(d) for large prime d.
(ii) Alice computes f v (x j ) as the shares of shareholder Bob j for j = 1, 2, ..., n, where x j ∈ GF(d) is the public information of Bob j with x j = x r for j = r.
(iii) Alice sends shares f v (x j ) to the corresponding shareholder Bob j through private channel securely. A shareholder Bob j is also called participant when he participates in secret reconstruction.
Secret Encoding. Assume that the dealer Alice wants to share 2 secrets S 1 , S 2 ∈ GF(d) among shareholders. In order to establish a verifiable (t, n)-QSS, Alice first picks S 3 ∈ GF (d) (verification value) with S 1 = S 2 · S 3 mod d for public large prime d, and then use single quantum system to realize the scheme. She first performs QFT on three standard orthogonal bases |p v0 , v = 1, 2, 3, then for each transformed basis, performs the generalized Pauli operation U 0,qv0 , where S v = p v0 and q v0 = d − s v . After that, Alice sends three qudits |Ψ v 0 to participants for secret reconstruction.
Sequential Operation of single quantum system. To share the dealer's secrets S 1 , S 2 , arbitrary m (m ≥ t) participants {Bob j , j = 1, 2, ..., m} should accomplish the following steps.
(i) To recover the secrets they sequentially complete their own operations which embed their components and random numbers into the quantum states. Specifically, suppose Bob 1 is the first participant who receives the three qudits from Alice, he performs the generalized Pauli operations U pv1,pv1+qv1 on each |Ψ v 0 , v = 1, 2, 3, respectively, where p v1 are mutually independent private random numbers, q v1 = c v1 = f v (x 1 ) m r=2 xr xr−x1 mod d, and p v1 , q v1 ∈ GF(d). As a result, he gets the processed states |Ψ v 1 . Then Bob 1 delivers the states |Ψ v 1 to Bob 2 .
(ii) Upon receiving the three qudits, each of the other participants Bob j , j = 2, 3, ..., m, repeats the same procedure sequentially as Bob 1 does. That is, each Bob j completes operations U pvj ,pvj +qvj on |Ψ v j−1 and gets the states |Ψ v j , where p vj , q vj ∈ GF(d), p vj are mutually independent random numbers and
Subsequently, Bob j , j = 2, 3, ..., m − 1 delivers the qudits |Ψ v j to the next participant Bob j+1 .
Secret Reconstruction. Finally, the last participant Bob m keeps and performs IQFT on the three qudits for accurate measurement. Then, all participants can recover the secrets and verify their correctness as follow.
(i) The last participant Bob m chooses the computational basis {|j , j = 0, 1, ..., d − 1} to measure the three states |Ψ v m , v = 1, 2, 3. Then, he publishes the 3 measurement results R 1 , R 2 , R 3 to all participants.
(ii) In a valid run, the measurement results R v , the dealer's secrets, p v0 and participants' private random numbers, p vj , j = 1, ..., m satisfy globally 
If it holds, the secret sharing attempt is not corrupt and thus the dealer's secrets S 1 = p 10 , S 2 = p 20 are successfully shared among all m participants; otherwise they are aware that this round is invalid and thus abort it.
Remark 4.
Following the above idea, a qudit with a normalized unknown state |ϕ = d−1 j=0 α j |j , d−1 j=0 |α j | 2 = 1 can also be shared among at least t shareholders by substituting the generalized Pauli operation U 0,qj for U pj ,pj +qj .
C. Correctness of the scheme
Now, we show the correctness of the proposed scheme. The proposed scheme uses 3 qudits |Ψ v 0 , v = 1, 2, 3 to share 2 secrets and 1 verification value. Since all operations on each qudit are similar, we remove the subscript v for simplicity, e.g., uniformly use |Ψ 0 to denote each qudit |Ψ v 0 , v = 1, 2, 3.
With dealer's operations, qudits are initially prepared in the state |Ψ 0 = 1
k=0 ω (p0+q0)·k |k . After all m participants complete their operations sequentially, the final state becomes
where ξ m = ω − m a=1 pa( a b=0 (p b +q b )) is an overall phase term. Since any participant in Shamir's (t, n)-SS can recover the secret by summing up all components, i.e.,
(9) Thus we have m j=1 c j = N d + s, N ∈ Z to ensure the correctness of the final state in Equ. (8) . Then Bob m performs IQFT on the qudit, giving
So after measuring the state in the computational basis, Bob m can get the results satisfying Equ. (6) . By exchanging random numbers, all participants can recover the secrets from the measurements as shown in Secret Reconstruction-(ii). Note that, in the last step, we drop the phase term ξ m since a global phase shift does not affect the (inverse) Fourier components of a given state.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
Most classical (t, n)-SS schemes are unconditionally secure. However, almost two decades after the first QSS, there exists no such a scheme (with or without entanglement) which has been proven to be unconditionally secure against cheating of dishonest players. A recent work presents a feasible entanglement-based continuous variable QSS scheme, and derives sufficient conditions for providing unconditional security of the dealer's classical secret against general attacks of an eavesdropper and arbitrary cheating strategies [36] . Furthermore, their results pave the way for experimental demonstration of an unconditionally secure QSS.
In this paper, we employ Shamir's (t, n)-SS to support the threshold structure and provide information theoretical security. In Secret Encoding, the dealer Alice adds each secret S v = p v0 , v = 1, 2 to the private value s v by the generalized Pauli operation U 0,qv0 . After the last participant Bob m completes his Pauli operation and IQFT, each measurement result is
. This process can be considered as an encryption of secret p v0 . Obviously, with the published R v , a participant can only reconstruct p v0 after collecting all private random numbers p vj , j = 1, 2, ...m and all m components c vj correctly. As a result, many attacks does not work, including intercept-resend attack and entangleand-measure attack mounted by an external eavesdropper or participant attack in association with entanglement swapping [29, 37, 38] .
In the following, we use Theorem 1 to prove the security against collusion attack by less than t participants. A (t, n)-QSS scheme is perfect with respect to the probability distribution of secret over secret space if less than t participants obtains no information about the secret. Theorem 1. The proposed (t, n)-QSS scheme is perfect with respect to the probability distribution of secret over secret space. That is,
where Ω denotes the set of shares available for less than t − 1 participants, H(S v ) is the information entropy of the secret S v , v = 1, 2 and I(S v ; Ω) represents the mutual information of S v with Ω.
Proof. Suppose that m(m ≥ t) participants {Bob j , j = 1, 2, ..., m}, with the corresponding shares {f v (x j ), j = 1, 2, ..., m, v = 1, 2}, collaborate to recover each secret S v , v = 1, 2 in normal case. Without losing generality, assume exactly t − 1 participants {Bob j , j = 1, 2, ..., t − 1} conspire in the attack and the participant Bob t−1 measures |Ψ v t−1 and publishes the results
After exchanging private random numbers and shares, {p vj , f v (x j ), j = 1, 2, ..., t−1}, each participant, e.g.,Bob j obtains the following result R v ′ = p v0 + d − s v mod d. Since p v0 is uniformly and randomly selected from GF(d) by Alice from the view of participants, hence, S v = p v0 is indistinguishable from a random variable uniformly distributed over GF(d), i.e., P (S v ) = 1/d. Consequently, the entropy of S v is H(S v ) = log d.
According to Shamir's [1] (t, n)-SS, for m ≥ t, each private value
and s v is uniformly distributed over GF(d) if t − 1 participants {Bob j , j = 1, 2, ..., t − 1} conspire. That is, with the shares Ω = {f v (x j ), j = 1, 2, ..., t − 1} available, they have the probability P (s v |Ω) = 1/d to obtain s v , i.e., P (S v |Ω) = 1/d due to R v ′ = p v0 + d − s v mod d and S v = p v0 . As a result, we have conditional entropy H(S v |Ω) = log d.
Therefore, we finally have
Since both secrets S v , v = 1, 2 and the verification value S 3 all satisfy the above equation, the proposed scheme is perfect with respect to probability distribution of secrets in the secret space GF(d).
To free from the trusted third party, the last participant is appointed to measure the qudit and thus, he directly knows the measurement results(i.e., the summations of each secret and random numbers). By publishing fake measurement results, the last participant itself recovers true secrets while causes others to obtain wrong secrets. Of course, other participant can also cheat by using a wrong share in secret reconstruction. Moreover, the qudits are obviously vulnerable to eavesdropping. Thus the proposed scheme establishes a verification mechanism to detect such cheat or eavesdropping.
Let consider the error rate of verification mechanism, i.e., the probability that the verification mechanism does not detect wrong secrets. The ideal error rate is certainly 0 since it means all false secrets can be detected during secret reconstruction.
Theorem 2. In the proposed scheme, the error rate of verification mechanism converges to 0 when the size of secret space approaches to infinity. That is,
where r e denotes the error rate and d represents the size of secret space.
Proof. For correct measurement results R v and the corresponding sums of random numbers of all participants, N v = m j=1 p vj , v = 1, 2, 3, assume that the last participant Bob m publishes the wrong measurements
happens to hold, the wrong measurement results cannot be detected. In this case, the verification mechanism fails and thus the other participants recover wrong secrets without being detected.
Obviously, if Bob m randomly and uniformly chooses 3 values R 1 ′ , R 2 ′ and R 3 ′ in GF(d) as measurement results and publishes them to the other participants, there are totally 
because, given {N 1 , N 2 , N 3 }, R 3 ′ can always be determined for randomly selected pairs of {R 1 ′ , R 2 ′ }. The result is the same if any other participant, i.e., Bob j , = 1, 2, ..., m − 1 cheats by releasing any different random number p ′ vj = p vj , v = 1, 2, 3 when exchanging random numbers.
Therefore, the error rate of the verification mechanism is r e = d 2 /d 3 = 1/d. Similarly, if we use k + 1 qudits to share k, (k > 2) secrets in GF(d), the error rate remains to be r e = d k /d k+1 = 1/d. Therefore,
That is, the error rate converges to 0 when d approaches to infinity.
In conclusion, the scheme can detect the cheat by participant with the probability (d − 1)/d, which converges to 100% if d is larger enough.
V. RELATED WORK AND COMPARISONS
Since the proposal of the first QSS [14] , various extension schemes have been proposed in last two decades. Many of them are based on entanglement states (HBBtype). Due to the high cost of engineering multiparticle entanglement states, efforts have been made for more economical HBB-type QSS through reducing the number of required particles [39, 40] . In a work [41] , the authors further generalize HBB-type QSS to d-level platform by utilizing multiparticle (> 3) entanglement GHZ states. An interesting entanglement-based QSS using entangled state as the secure carriers and splitters of information has been studied in [42] . However, all those schemes are poor in scalability with growing participants and may easily render an invalid run because a participant may fail in measurement due to inefficient detection. Different from entanglement-based HBB-type QSS, some entanglement-free schemes [26] [27] [28] have also been proposed. But these schemes will be of less interest for secret sharing due to some drawbacks, e.g. they are all (n, n) structures which are not flexible under different applications and they offer no unconditional security.
As for schemes with (t, n) structure, the first one was proposed in 1999 [13] . It shows that the only constraint on the existence of (t, n) threshold schemes comes from quantum no-cloning theorem, which requires n < 2t. Moreover, the paper gives efficient constructions of threshold schemes which divides a secret quantum state into n shares, such that any t or more than t participants can recover the initial state using linear transformation. However, mapping a quantum state to n quantum states by coding is difficult and the scheme is not easy to extend when the mapping rules are determined. Later, some other schemes with general (t, n) threshold structure were proposed. Among these schemes, those in [43] [44] [45] benefit from continuous variable and thus, they are easier to implement in practical experiments. Others employ graph states, which provide a superb resource for secret sharing, to construct QSS schemes [45] [46] [47] . Recently, a new method was developed by taking advantage of the ability of exactly distinguishing orthogonal multipartite entangled states under restricted local operation and classical communication [48] [49] [50] .
Unlike those utilizing special quantum systems, some other threshold QSS schemes are proposed, in which the threshold structures are supported by a classical (t, n)-SS. For example, the schemes in [51, 52] employ Shamir's (t, n)-SS in the field of F 2 N and some unitary operations to encode classical bit strings. After that, phase shift operation is used to embed private values in classical secret sharing (e.g., shares in Shamir's (t, n)-SS or elements in linear equation) into quantum states, and secrets can be retrieved by recovering the quantum states [53, 54] . Re-cently, a (t, n) QSS scheme in d-dimension supported by QFT and Shamir's (t, n)-SS was proposed [55] . Generally speaking, a d-level QSS is more universal and practical than 2-level ones. But in such a scheme, a trusted third party (e.g., the dealer) is required to measure the quantum states in secret reconstruction and, as HBB-type ones, it is not scalable either.
Compared with these (t, n) schemes, our scheme only employs sequential d-level unitary operations in association with classical (t, n) threshold secret sharing on a single qudit. Besides, the scheme use 3 values in GF(d) to share 2 secrets in the same range. If we define the information rate of coding as the ratio of the length of secret to that of code carrying the secret. therefore, the information rate of coding is 2/3. In general case, the scheme uses k + 1 values (embedded into k + 1 qudits) to share k secrets. Therefore, the information rate of coding is k/k + 1 and thus converges to 1 when k approaches to infinity. Moreover, our scheme also shows great scalability and possesses strict threshold structure. Furthermore, benefiting from the verification mechanism, the proposed (t, n)-QSS scheme doesn't require any trusted third party responsible for measurement results, and any cheat by a participant or eavesdropping can be detected.
VI. CONCLUSION
This work proposes a verifiable framework for threshold QSS without entanglement. Such a scheme allows to incorporate any single quantum system to enable QSS without entanglement and utilize existing classical (t, n)-SS to keep (t, n)-threshold structure. Besides, a verification mechanism is established for thwarting cheat and eavesdropping attacks. As an example, we demonstrate a concrete (t, n)-QSS scheme using QFT and generalized Pauli operation. It shares k secrets and an extra verification value with sequential applications of generalized Pauli operation. At last, each participant can independently recovers secrets and verifies the correctness from measurement results. We further prove that the proposed scheme is perfectly secure and the verification mechanism is sufficient since the error rate converges to 0 if the size of secret space approaches infinity. Thus, this class of entanglement-free (t, n)-QSS schemes constructed under our framework can address the drawbacks in previous entanglement-free QSS and will be more useful in quantum communication networks due to their intrinsic scalability, flexibility and perfect security.
